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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL J. GODFREY, I 
I REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, I 
I District Court No. 910000015 
vs. I 
I Court of Appeals No. 940167-CA 
MARIA OLIVA GODFREY, I 
I Priority Classification: 15 
Defendant/Appellant. I 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter f,Ms. Godfrey") submits the following 
as her reply brief of appellant herein: 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Godfrey did not set forth a Statement of Facts based on the evidence 
contained in the trial record. He referred to no testimony, no exhibits, nor pleadings 
from this case. Rather, he simply reiterated the Trial Court's Supplemental Findings 
of Fact issued on remand from the prior appeal. He quoted said Findings verbatim 
as though they were facts derived from the evidence. While the Findings may 
constitute the Trial Court's interpretation of the facts in evidence, they nowhere refer 
to the trial testimony, exhibits, nor pleadings. In addition, the trial evidence contains 
no support for some Findings made. There is no support either in the testimony, nor 
exhibits, nor pleadings for some of the Findings. 
Because of Mr. Godfrey's failure to set forth facts based on the evidence, Ms. 
Godfrey responds in two fashions: First, she will set forth those portions of the 
Findings for which there is no support in the trial record. Second, she will highlight 
the portions of the evidence relevant to the two main issues she raised on this appeal: 
The alimony award, and the valuation and distribution of the marital stock. 
Findings for Which There is No Support in the Record 
There is no support in the record for the portion of the Findings set forth in 
the italics below: 
The plaintiffs father at one time placed the nursing home in trust 
with his five children as equal beneficiaries, one of whom was the 
plaintiff. The father revoked the trust, and then created a corporation 
to run the nursing home and gave the corporation a lease for a period 
often years commencing July 1st, 1985. At the time of the trial there 
was approximately three-and-a-half (3 1/2) years left on the lease. The 
father created 1,000 shares in the corporation giving each one of his five 
children 200 shares. The plaintiff received 200 shares as one of the five 
children. The Court must be mindful that these acts were done by an 
elderly Brigham City man. It has become fashionable in later years to 
treat different children differently in inheritance. The Court is mindful 
of the general conduct of the community and among people of the father 
of the plaintiff s age. The word "birthright'9 was commonly used. Many 
people regarded it as a sin to favor one child over another, absent serious 
shortcomings of a child. This man acted twice in accordance with that 
ancient custom. (R.517-518) 
No testimony, exhibits, nor pleadings contain any support for the italicized 
portion above. Mr. Godfrey's father did not testify at trial. He was deceased at that 
time. Neither did either party testify as to Mr. Godfrey's father's purpose in creating 
the trust or the corporation. Nor did they testify as to the father's rationale in giving 
equal shares of the stock and real estate to each of the five (5) siblings. Neither was 
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there any evidence submitted as to what was fashionable in the community for 
persons of Mr. Godfrey's father's age regarding inheritance. None of the exhibits, nor 
pleadings contain any support for the italicized observations imposed on the evidence 
in the record by the Trial Court's Findings. 
The trial record is also vacuous concerning the italicized portion of the 
Findings below: 
In an effort to arrive at a just living standard for the defendant 
wife is to guided by what conventional wisdom would indicate, that a 
couple ought to spend after the bankruptcy passes. It is clear to the 
Court the parties lived beyond their means. This can be noted quickly 
when one looks at credit card debt, et cetera. The court has made an 
effort to make the dollars on each side come out exactly even, partly 
because even though this plaintiff occupies one job, he works long hours 
and his position and part of his income is directly related to his 
inheritance. What the court is attempting to do is to give to the 
defendant monies above and beyond her earnings that would give her a 
living standard commensurate with her position in the community. 
(R.524) 
It should first be noted that the Trial Court considered it appropriate "to arrive 
at a just living standard for the defendant wife" based on a budgetary situation of 
bankruptcy. No bankruptcy type budget constraints were imposed on Mr. Godfrey 
by the Trial Court. 
Nowhere does the evidence in the record establish what Ms. Godfrey's "position 
in the community" was or should be. There was no testimony, nor other support, for 
what "would give her a living standard commensurate" thereto. Further, this 
rationale as a basis for alimony, is based entirely on the arbitrary views of the Trial 
Court on community standards. The Trial Court thereby created its own new 
alimony standard ignoring this Court's directives as noted by the Trial Court itself: 
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The appellate court has required additional findings on the issue 
of alimony. The Court has directly call (sic) the trial court's attention 
to the need to consider three (3) things. First, their living standard 
before or at the time of the divorce; second, the wife's ability to provide 
for her own needs; and third, the husband's ability to provide. (R.523) 
The aforesaid factors upon which to base alimony are in accord with a number 
of prior Utah cases: (Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Ut. App. 1989); Boyle v. 
Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); and English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 411-12 (Utah 1977)) 
The new alimony criteria enunciated by the Trial Court ~ a living standard 
commensurate with community position - is at odds with the foregoing precedents. 
When the Trial Court orally announced this new criteria, Ms. Godfrey's counsel 
contended it was a legally incorrect standard: 
Her position in the community is totally irrelevant. It's what her 
living costs and standards are, I think. Frankly, I don't think there's a 
shred of evidence in the record what the living standards of the 
community are. I think what you need to do is say he makes X number 
and she makes so much and her living costs are this much and he ought 
to be able to pay this much. (T4:38 L13-20) 
In response to Ms. Godfrey's argument the Trial Court stated: "I think all 
judges have a right to say some things about the community." (T4:40 L17-18) Ms. 
Godfrey's counsel then lamented: That may or may not be correct. I don't think 
there's a bit of evidence to support it." The Trial Court then admitted: It's my best 
guess." (T4:40 L19-21) 
Highlights of Facts Relevant to Alimony 
It is important to recognize that this case involves a long term marriage. The 
parties were married for nearly twenty-two (22) years. (T3:4 L18-22) Also, there is 
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a significant disparity between the parties' actual income. Mr. Godfrey enjoyed an 
average annual income of $54,931.00 during the five (5) years prior to the divorce. 
(D-1, contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "E") In addition, Mr. Godfrey has use of a 
1990 Mercedes provided by his employer. His employer pays for the insurance, 
maintenance and fuel costs having a value of $700.00 per month, or $8,400.00 per 
year. 
Ms. Godfrey's only income is derived from her work as an Animal control 
Officer for Brigham City (T3:142 L6-8) Her annual income averaged only $22,848.00 
during the five (5) years prior to the divorce. (T3:107 L6-14) (Exhibit "E", prior 
Brief) 
At the inception of this matter, Mr. Godfrey was ordered by Judge Gunnell to 
pay $800.00 per month in temporary alimony (Order dated February 27, 1991, R.74, 
Paragraph 3) Mr. Godfrey refused to pay alimony as ordered. At an Order to Show 
Cause hearing held May 21, 1991, Commissioner Allphin awarded judgements of 
"$2,000.00 representing alimony arrearage through May, 1991" and "$1,500.00 as an 
award of temporary attorney's fees." (R.118, Paragraphs 1 and 2) Mr. Godfrey had 
willfully refused to pay the alimony ordered while having the ability to do so. Thus, 
Commissioner Allphin found Mr. Godfrey in contempt and ordered 24 hour jail unless 
Mr. Godfrey paid the $3,500.00 in judgments by June 20, 1991. (R.118, Paragraph 
4) 
Mr. Godfrey belligerently continued refusing to pay. A second Order to Show 
Cause hearing on his wilful refusal was held on July 22,1991. At hearing, Judge Pat 
Brian found Mr. Godfrey in contempt a second time. The twenty-four (24) hour jail 
sentence previously issued was imposed and the alimony and attorney fee judgments 
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were updated and set at a total of $2,710.00 as of the hearing date. (R.175-6) 
Mr. Godfrey's conduct during the ensuing four months demonstrates his ability 
to pay the $1,250.00 per month in alimony sought by Ms. Godfrey on appeal. Judge 
Brian's Order required Mr. Godfrey to continue making his $800.00 per month 
ongoing payments and simultaneously pay $677.50 per month during the four months 
following the hearing to satisfy the $2,710.00 arrearage. If Mr. Godfrey did not so 
perform, he faced an additional ten (10) days in jail. (R.175-6) 
Mr. Godfrey had the ability to meet his $1,477.50 per month obligation during 
the ensuing four (4) months. His doing so shows that when necessary, Mr. Godfrey 
has the ability to pay even more than the $1,250.00 per month in alimony being 
sought by Ms. Godfrey. 
Ms. Godfrey supported her alimony request in part by an Hourly Wage 
Comparison. (D-2, contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "F") Her testimony indicates 
that she needed at least $1,000.00 per month in alimony (T3:121 L15-19) The 
Hourly Wage Comparison showed that such an award would still leave Mr. Godfrey 
with more available income than her. The Comparison did not include his $800.00 
per month received from his father's estate (R.117, Paragraph 2) nor the $700.00 per 
month value of the Mercedes. 
Ms. Godfrey demonstrated her reasonable monthly expenses to be $2,128.00 
in excess of her net income. (D-8, contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "G") Her 
expenses show that with only $1,000.00 per month in alimony she would have a 
$1,128.00 shortfall. 
At trial, Ms. Godfrey submitted her Alimony Request for $1,200.00 per month 
(D-9, contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "H") Said Exhibit demonstrates that even 
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with $1,200.00 per month she would still experience a $928.00 per month shortfall 
between her income and expenses. 
Mr. Godfrey claimed while paying an average of $1,212.91 in alimony per 
month during the few months prior to trial, his shortfall was $1,319.98. (P-2, 
contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "I") Said Exhibit shows Mr. Godfrey's ability to 
pay over $1,200.00 per month in alimony. 
Further, it demonstrates that a $1,200.00 per month award would result in 
both parties having to reduce their expenses by similar amount. Her shortfall equals 
$928.00. His shortfall equals $1,319.98. The difference between them equals 
$391.98. That difference would certainly be more than compensated for, when 
considering the tax deductions to him and the tax liability to her for $1,200.00 per 
month alimony. Thus, the evidence on the parties income and expenses clearly 
demonstrates that at least a $1,200.00 per month award is necessary to equalized the 
parties' standard of living. 
Highlights of Facts Relevant to the Nursing Home Stock 
It is undisputed that Ms. Godfrey contributed significantly to the nursing 
home's success by her employment there without compensation for approximately 
thirteen (13) years. (T3:142 L6-8) She performed numerous duties including working 
as a nurses aid, a decorator, housekeeper, in the laundry, and transporting patients. 
She also ran errands, helped prepare banquets, and performed many other tasks for 
the nursing home. (T3:117 L6 to 118 L18, T3:162 L10-21, T3:169 L9 to 190 L9) 
Mr. Vaughn Brent Cox was the only witness called as an expert to value the 
nursing home stock. The extreme high degree of his expertise for performing such 
a task is undisputed. He holds both a bachelor's degree in finance and a master's 
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degree in business administration with an emphasis in finance from the University 
of Utah. (T3:173 L24 to 174 L2) His knowledge and experience highly qualify him 
as a neutral expert to fairly value the stock. This is demonstrated by the following: 
a) His ongoing continuing education in business valuation as a specialty. 
(T3:174 L10-13) 
b) His certification by the American society of Appraisers as a senior 
appraiser in business valuation. (T3:174 L10-15, T3:180 L4-18) 
c) His past extensive publishing on business evaluation, including both a 
book and newsletter specializing in valuing family businesses. 
d) His extensive university level teaching experience. (T3:179 L15-23) 
e) His vast business appraisal experience of over 500 businesses. (T3:197 
L13-22) 
f) His prior experience as an expert witness in valuing businesses. (T3:197 
L13-22) 
Mr. Cox used four different earnings based methods in valuing the 200 stock 
shares. Under the "gross revenue multiplier method" he arrived at a value of 
$78,000.00. (T3:188 L7-16) Applying a very common method in valuing nursing 
homes, the "price per bed method", he concluded the fair market value to be 
$68,000.00. (T3:188 L7-16) Using the "operating profit capitalization method" 
indicated a value of $54,000.00. (T3:189 L2 to 191 L12) Last, using a commonly 
employed method in the industry, the "price to earnings ratio method", he valued the 
stock at $61,000.00. (T3:191 to 193 L14) 
Based on all four of the foregoing methods, Mr. Cox concluded the 200 stock 
shares had a value in the open market of $65,000.00 
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REPLY TO SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Godfrey states that Ms. Godfrey's "employment income is better than that 
of most similarly situated women...". (Mr. Godfrey's Brief, at the bottom of page 13) 
This remark relies on the Findings made by the Trial Court. As discussed above, 
there is no evidence in the record to support this. Further, whether or not the 
statement is true is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. If such a fact were relevant, 
alimony would be determined by the economic status of women in each particular 
community. Alimony awards would thus vary between communities throughout Utah 
even when considered under the same set of facts. 
The correct basis for alimony should be a consideration of the requesting 
spouse's needs and ability, along with the prospective payor spouse's ability to 
provide. A community economic standard as a basis for alimony is also 
inappropriately sexist, whereas such a standard is based on gender classification. 
Such a standard is contrary to Utah law as well as federal law, being discriminatory 
on the basis of sex. 
Mr. Godfrey also contends he "is the administrator of a small fifty (50) bed 
nursing home in a non metropolitan area which may soon be a home without a home 
at the expiration of a short life lease on real estate." (Brief, page 14) The Trial court 
correctly found that Mr. Godfrey and his siblings each owned an equal "share of the 
real estate and his share of the management corporation". (Findings, at the 
beginning of Paragraph 5(a), at R. 518) At the hearing on remand the Trial Court 
also noted: "Each was to have an equal share in the business, just as they held in 
the real estate,..." (T4:13 L12-14) The Trial Court accurately observed that the 
company bookkeeper maintained the corporate records reflecting "that because the 
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real estate owners and the management owners are currently the same people the 
lease will be extended." (Emphasis added) (T4:25 L22-25) 
There is no distinction between the real property owners and the owners of the 
nursing home business. Mr. Godfrey, along with his siblings, own and control both 
the business and the real property where the business operates. There is no reason 
to believe the lease, scheduled to expire in 1995, would not be renewed between the 
business owners and the real property owners, who are the same. They could just 
as easily prematurely terminate the lease between themselves as they could extend 
it at their sole discretion. There is no basis to perceive the longevity of the business 
being in jeopardy on the mere basis of the lease's scheduled expiration date. The only 
reason the business would not continue to lease the property beyond 1995 would be 
because the owners of both the business and the real property elected not to do so. 
Mr. Godfrey also argues that the "valuation on the corporate stock is 
reasonable and the method for its distribution and the wife's equity is fair and within 
the discretion of the trial court." (Brief, page 14) The valuation of the stock made 
by the Trial Court at only $20,000.00 was an abuse of discretion -- being clearly 
erroneous when considering the six factors discussed in Ms. Godfrey's prior Brief on 
pages 30-38 and amplified below in reply to Mr. Godfrey's Point V. 
REPLY TO POINT I 
In this point, Mr. Godfrey introduces the first of the three criteria enunciated 
in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) and in other cases, used in determining 
alimony: The ability of the requesting spouse to produce sufficient income for that 
spouse's needs. 
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Mr. Godfrey contends there "is no indication in the evidence that [Ms. Godfrey] 
is unable to pursue her employment". Though Ms. Godfrey may be able to perform 
her present work now, her testimony reflects it was imlikely that she could do that 
work very long. (T3:120 L20-25) 
Mr. Godfrey's argument employs the same incorrect legal standard for alimony 
determination as did the Trial Court. Mr. Godfrey suggests the "standard 
commensurate with her position in the community" (Mr. Godfrey's Brief, page 15, line 
5) is the basis for determining the sum of alimony a woman receives. As discussed 
above, this standard would result in women throughout Utah receiving widely 
differing awards under the same set of facts. Though divorcing husbands and wives 
in two different communities where the evidence in the cases may show identical 
income and expenses, the alimony would vary based on speculation by the Trial Court 
as to what a woman's financial/economic position in the community should be. 
If not determined by what it should be, then perhaps what it is at the time of 
the divorce. If determined at the time of divorce, the requesting spouse's financial 
situation at that time would simply be confirmed. It is doubtful that the Trial Court 
intended this view of its "attempt to give the defendant monies above and beyond her 
earnings that would give her a living standard commensurate with her position in the 
community". Thus, it appears the Trial Court invented this new erroneous 
"community position" standard speculating as to what such should be for Ms. 
Godfrey. Imposing this erroneous standard was a clear abuse of discretion. 
To employ the correct Jones criteria for determining alimony, it is useful for 
the Trial Court to perform some simple mathematical comparisons based on the 
evidence concerning the parties' income and expenses. Mr, Godfrey concludes his 
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Point I by stating: "The addition of $450, the original alimony, is, if anything, 
excessive where she has an earning capacity of $23,000 per year and compensatory 
alimony of $2,400 per year." Mr. Godfrey fails to support this by the appropriate 
financial comparisons contained in the evidence. 
The monthly financial figures used below are derived from Exhibits D-8, D-9 
and P-2, contained in Ms. Godfrey's prior Brief as "G", "H", and "I". 
Ms. Godfrey Mr. Godfrey 
Monthly net take home pay $958 $2,415 
Monthly expenses (not including alimony) -$3,086 -$2,522 
Monthly shortfall ($2,128) ($107) 
Alimony at $1,213 as per Exhibit P-2 +$1,213 -$1,213 
Net shortfall including alimony ($915) ($1,320) 
Income tax adjustment at 20% -$243 +$243 
Net shortfall after tax adjustment ($1,158) ($1,077) 
Net disparity ($1158 - $1,077) = $81.00 
The 20% income tax factor shown above is conservative for Mr. Godfrey. Given 
his actual income, he is likely to save considerably more that $243.00 per month from 
the deduction of alimony on his state and federal taxes. As can be seen above, 
though Ms. Godfrey still ends up with $81.00 per month more in shortfall than Mr. 
godfrey, alimony at $1,213.00 per month comes close to equalizing the parties' 
standard of living. The sum of $1,250.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary 
amount to equalized the parties post-divorce living standards. An award of $1,250.00 
per month would result in both parties having to reduce their expenses by a near 
equal amount. 
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REPLY TO POINT II 
Under this point, Mr. Godfrey discusses the second of the three Jones factors 
for alimony determination: The financial conditions and needs of the requesting 
spouse. Citing Bingham v. Bingham, 874 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. 1994) Mr. 
Godfrey contends "the court should not award defendant more than her established 
needs require". (Mr. Godfrey's Brief, at the top of page 16) Ms. Godfrey 
acknowledges the alimony limitation principle of Bingham. Nevertheless, Bingham 
is not applicable to this case. 
In this matter Ms. Godfrey's financial need for her to meet her budget equals 
$2,128.00. (Prior Brief, Exhibit "G") Ms. Godfrey agrees that even if Mr. Godfrey 
had the ability to pay in excess of $2,128.00 alimony per month, the award should not 
exceed that demonstrated amount of need. Nevertheless, Ms. Godfrey demonstrated 
that her need far exceeds the $650.00 per month awarded by the Trial Court. Thus, 
Bingham does not limit alimony in this matter to $650.00 per month. 
Mr. Godfrey next argues that alimony should be apparently based on a 
different living standard for Ms. Godfrey than for him. He quotes the Trial Court's 
Findings which include the following: "In an effort to arrive at a just living standard 
for the defendant wife is to be guided by what conventional wisdom would indicate, 
that a couple aught to spend after the bankruptcy passes." (Emphasis added) Thus, 
the Trial Court established that Ms. Godfrey's needs should be confined as though in 
a bankrupt context. Mr. Godfrey's needs were apparently not similarly constrained. 
An award of $1,250.00 per month would, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' 
living standards. The Trial Court only awarded $650.00 per month. Considering the 
parties' income and expenses, that award provides Ms. Godfrey with $600.00 less, and 
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Mr. Godfrey with $600.00 more per month, a difference of $1,200.00 per month. 
It was clearly erroneous for the Trial Court to treat Ms. Godfrey's needs as 
though in bankruptcy while not so treating Mr. Godfrey. The $650.00 per month 
award results in Mr. Godfrey having $1,200.00 more than Ms. Godfrey for his living 
expenses. Under the current award, Mr. Godfrey, while not being constrained to a 
bankruptcy type budget by the Trial Court, is provided $1,200.00 more per month to 
spend towards his expenses. Such a disparity is patently unfair and inequitable. 
Next, Mr. Godfrey argues that it is incorrect "that the two incomes of the 
separated parties are to be equalized through the device of granting alimony not 
based on need". (Emphasis added) Nowhere has Mr. Godfrey argued that alimony 
should not be based on her need. Rather, she has demonstrated that she has a need 
of $2,128.00 above her net income to meet her expenses. While that need may exceed 
Mr. Godfrey's ability to pay, he clearly has the ability to pay $1,250.00 per month to 
equalized their living standards. 
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' post-
divorce living standards. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P2d 1209 (Ut. App. 1991); 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Ut. App. 1988); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144 (Ut. App. 1988); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 546 (Utah 1985); and Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). It is certainly possible to equalize the parties' living 
standards in this matter with alimony at $1,250.00 per month, which sum would only 
require Mr. Godfrey to reduce his expenses by an amount similar to Ms. Godfrey. 
The present $650.00 per month award results in Mr. Godfrey retaining 65% of 
the parties' combined gross income, leaving Ms. Godfrey with only 35%. (See prior 
Brief at page 15) Thus, the Trial Court's award results in Mr. Godfrey retaining 
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nearly double the income compared to Ms. Godfrey. The Trial Court abused its 
discretion in making an award which gives Mr. Godfrey nearly twice the available 
income as Ms. Godfrey. 
REPLY TO POINT HI 
Under this point Mr. Godfrey addresses the last of the three Jones criteria: 
The ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Mr. Godfrey states the "trial court 
found that after alimony of $650 per month he would be left with about $37,000 per 
year and stated, 'His future is very precarious.' (Record, 525)" The evidence does not 
support the Trial Court's finding that "he would be left with about $37,000 per year". 
Mr. Godfrey averaged $54,931.00 annual income from all sources during the five 
years prior to trial. (D-l, contained in prior Brief as Exhibit "E") That average 
combined with he $8,400.00 yearly automobile allowance, yields him $63,331.00 in 
gross annual income. Subtracting the Trial Court's new $7,800.00 award in alimony 
per year leaves him with $55,531.00 per year, not $37,000.00. 
Ms. Godfrey's gross annual income, including the new alimony award is only 
$30,800.00. Thus, the $650.00 per month award leaves Mr. Godfrey with $24,731.00 
more than Ms. Godfrey. Obviously, Mr. Godfrey has the ability to pay far more than 
$650.00 per month. Paying $1,250.00 per month would result in Mr. godfrey's future 
being no more precarious than that of Ms. Godfrey. Both would have equal spending 
ability and both would need to adjust their budget by a similar amount. 
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REPLY TO POINT IV 
The Trial Court valued the stock at only $20,000.00. That valuation is based 
on the purchase by Mr. Godfrey, subsequent to trial but prior to remand, of 200 
additional stock shares from a brother. Such a transaction is not "arms-length" and 
thus is not representative of fair market value. Closely held stock should not be 
valued based on a transaction which is not "arms-length". (See Welch, "Discovery and 
Valuation in a Divorce Division Involving a Closely-Held Business or Professional 
Practice", 7 Community Property Journal 102 (1980) and Epstein, "Practice Points: 
Valuation of Stock in Closely Held Corporations", 5 Review of Taxation of Individuals 
369(1981)) 
The Trial Court's valuation was based on a friendly sale between brothers. 
The only evidence of what the stock is actually worth in the market was present by 
Mr. Cox. He valued the stock at $65,000.00, which sum he concluded based on his 
range of values from $54,000.00 to $78,000.00. Those values included a discount for 
the minority interest where appropriate. It was an abuse of discretion for the Trial 
Court to choose a value based on a non "arms-length" transaction rather than choose 
from the range based on actual fair market value. 
REPLY TO POINT V 
Mr. Godfrey's testimony on the value of the stock is based solely on his own 
perception as he states in his Brief. Nevertheless, his testimony is deficient when 
compared to Mr. Cox's testimony for the following reasons: 
1) The Trial court erred in assigning the entire weight of testimony in favor 
of Mr. Godfrey, a lay party witness, while giving no weight whatsoever to Mr. Cox's 
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neutral expert testimony. 
2) The Trial Court erred in basing the stock's value on Mr. Godfrey's 
unskilled opinion. Mr. Godfrey's opinion has little or no probative value. Also, the 
Trial Court's $20,000.00 valuation is based on a sale of 200 other stock shares to Mr. 
Godfrey from one of his brothers. Such a sale is in no way an "arms length" 
transaction and lacking necessary neutrality, is not representative of fair market 
value. 
3) The Trial court erred in not accepting Mr. Cox's value as conclusive. No 
other expert gave an opinion of value other than Mr. Cox. His opinion was not in 
conflict with other expert testimony. The only other evidence of value was based on 
Mr. Godfrey's lay testimony. The testimony of Mr. Godfrey, being a party to the 
action, is intrinsically biased. Proper valuation of the stock required specialized skill 
and concerned a matter of business appraisal science. The complexities of the 
minority interest, and the fact that the same individual owners of the real property 
also own the business, were correctly taken into consideration by Mr. Cox. 
4) The Trial Court erred in arbitrarily disregarding and ignoring Mr. Cox's 
valuation. Mr. Cox's testimony was not impeached in any way. There was no reason 
for the Trial Court to disregard and ignore Mr. Cox's opinion. It was clearly 
erroneous for the Trial Court to arbitrarily do so. 
5) The Trial Court erred in relying on Mr. Godfrey's testimony which was 
obtained by leading questions posed by his own counsel. Mr. Godfrey's opinion as to 
value while being led under his counsel, has little, if any, probative value. It was 
clearly erroneous for the Trial Court to place its entire weight upon such leading 
testimony. 
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6) The Trial Court erred in arriving at the $20,000.00 value by speculation 
and conjecture. The Trial Court clearly speculated that the stock would be 
"worthless, or nearly worthless" simply because the existing lease of the real property 
was scheduled to expire in 1995. (Findings, at last half of R.520) The Trial Court 
also erred by employing "fair market value" by conjecture. Proper valuation of the 
stock for property division purposes is that value for which the stock would actually 
sell in the open market - fair market value. Both Utah Code Section 59-2-102(7) and 
IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60 (used for valuing closely held stock) define "fair market 
value" as the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both 
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. 
The Trial Court valued the stock under a forced and compelled selling 
situation, an inaccurate conjecture of "fair market value". The Trial Court stated the 
stock would be "nearly worthless at general auction". (R.520) It also, "concluded that 
if the corporation were to be dissolved and the equity divided, there would be little 
to distribute." (Findings, towards the end of Paragraph 5(c), at R.521) The nursing 
home was not being dissolved, nor was it being sold at auction. It was a profitable 
ongoing business. Fair market value is not arrived at by using a liquidation 
approach. It was clearly erroneous for the Trial Court to speculate and conjecture 
that a forced auction or liquidation would achieve a sale equating to "fair market 
value". 
Mr. Godfrey was entitled to give his opinion as to the value of the stock. 
Nevertheless, his testimony is not sufficient to rebut the fair market valuation 
methods employed by Mr. Cox. Mr. Godfrey argues that Mr. Cox made comparison 
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of sales in metropolitan areas to the subject nursing home and that this comparison 
was faulty. Mr. Godfrey refers to the comparable "sales of nursing care facilities in 
Utah County, Utah, at $30,000 per bed." He then argues that "Utah County is 
definitely metropolitan and viable facilities in Utah County are not fifty beds." 
Mr. Godfrey cites no evidence in support of Utah County being metropolitan 
nor that the nursing home facilities sold and compared to the subject home by Mr. 
Cox were larger than fifty beds. Mr. Cox compared the subject nursing home to the 
most similar nursing homes available. He used a conservative 1.4 multiplier where 
the average multiplier is 1.5 - 1.6 for the Gross Revenue Multiplier Method. The 
price per bed he used for the subject home was only $25,000. Such sum is less than 
any of the prices per bed for all comparably sold homes he found. Mr. Cox testified 
that the nationwide average price per bed is $33,000 and that the similar homes 
which had recently sold in Utah county sold for more than $30,000 per bed. Only 
when computing value under the Operating Profit Capitalization Method did Mr. Cox 
use a rate slightly higher than average. He employed a 12% capitalization rate 
where the average was 10.6%. The average multiplier for publicly traded companies 
under the Price to Earnings Ratio Method was 23.0. Mr. Cox used a multiplier of 
only 18.0 in valuing the subject home under this last method. As a whole, Mr. Cox 
was quite conservative in employing the methods he used to arrive at a fair market 
value for the stock. 
Mr. Godfrey notes that the subject facility "did not produce an operating profit 
in the last year of analysis." It should not be surprising that the company's profits 
would decline during the year the parties were going through the divorce. Mr. 
Godfrey has a great deal of control over the company's financial success. It should 
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not be astonishing that the company showed less income while the parties disputed 
its value prior to trial. Mr. Godfrey had an incentive against company earnings 
during the dispute. 
Also, Mr. Cox took the company's last year's earnings prior to trial into 
consideration when averaging the company's profit over the previous five years. 
While questioning Mr. Cox, Mr. Godfrey's counsel emphasized the company's lower 
income during the year just prior to trial. (T3:208 L19 to 209 L22) Mr. Cox 
responded that it's "not uncommon for a business to have - to show a loss situation 
for one or two years and still have substantial value". Mr. Cox also provided the 
following explanation as to why the low income in the last year would not 
significantly effect the company's fair market value: 
The nursing home industry is a somewhat homogeneous industry. 
What that means is that the operation of a nursing home is not really 
that much different here in Brigham City than it is in Orem or South 
Jordan or other cities throughout the country. So the real key to 
whether a nursing home has value is whether that individual nursing 
home is successful. 
I think if you look at the history of the Godfrey Foothill Retreat, 
you'll find several years of successful operation. Because of that I think 
any other company that has experienced an ownership and management 
of nursing homes could come in and have a pretty good chance of 
succeeding. (T3:213 L25 to 214 L13) 
Mr. Godfrey's testimony as to the stock's value may have intended to rebut, 
modify or explain, or otherwise minimize Mr. Cox's testimony. Nevertheless, because 
of the deficiencies discussed above, his testimony should not have been accepted as 
a basis to value the stock. Only Mr. Cox's testimony provides a fair market valuation 
based on the applicable principles for performing such a task. 
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REPLY TO POINT VI 
It is true "that the trial court can make such compensating adjustments to both 
the property division and the alimony award as it deems necessary to make the 
ultimate decision equitable," as noted by Mr. Godfrey in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). Nevertheless, Martinez reviewed the single issue of whether 
the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a new remedy in divorce cases which it 
called "equitable restitution" and its decision that such may be awarded in addition 
to alimony, child support, and property. The Utah Supreme Court decided the 
creation of the new "equitable restitution" category was error. Martinez does not 
support alimony being increased to offset the value of property such as stock if the 
result is inequitable. Such an offset in this case clearly results in an ultimate 
decision which is inequitable. Martinez indicates that adjustments between property 
and alimony must achieve an equitable result. 
Offsetting the stock's value by an increase in alimony is inequitable for the 
following reasons: Ms. Godfrey would clearly lose her alimony, including the $200.00 
increase upon remarriage. Mr. Godfrey argues that "[u]nless further ordered by the 
court the defendant could be paid $200.00 per month for the stock interest, and 
retroactively too, far into the foreseeable future. See Title 30-3-5(5), 1953 Utah Code 
Ann., as amended." This interpretation is contrary to both the express statutory 
provision cited and contrary to this Court's interpretation thereof: 
Alimony is presumed to terminate upon remarriage of the 
receiving spouse. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1989) states that "[ujnless 
a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of the former spouse". 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1993) 
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Nowhere did the Trial Court in this matter grant alimony which would 
continue beyond the remarriage of Ms. Godfrey. If Ms. Godfrey remarried, her 
receipt of alimony would automatically terminate. One-half of Mr. Cox's $65,000 
stock value equals $32,500. Thus, the $200.00 per month ($2,400.00 per year) 
increase in alimony prevents Ms. Godfrey from remarrying for nearly 15 years to 
realize her $32,500 fair share. Even at the Trial Court's erroneous $20,000 value, 
Mr. Godfrey would not realize her $10,000 half if she were to remarry within four 
years of the divorce. 
It was inequitable for the Trial Court to raise alimony to offset the stock's 
value in this matter. In Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Utah App. 1987) this 
Court made a number of recommendations for dividing the value of stock in a matter 
such as the instant case. Lee suggests that marital assets consisting of stock in a 
closely held family corporation can be distributed in divorce proceedings by the 
following means: A cash settlement, division of the stock, awarding offsetting 
property, or cash payment over time. In addition to erroneous valuation of such 
stock, Lee was also remanded because of an insufficient alimony award. While 
addressing both stock and alimony issues, nowhere does Lee suggest that the value 
of stock be offset by awarding an increase in alimony above that which is otherwise 
appropriate. 
Both Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984) and Berry v. Berry, 635 
P.2d at 69-70 (Utah 1981) dealt with the division of family owned stock. Both cases 
state that a lump sum payment or payments over time are the best methods to 
achieve an equitable distribution of closely held stock. 
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Also, any payment in consideration of the stock's value should be separate from 
alimony in this matter. Such payment should not reduce the alimony otherwise 
appropriate because the payments are in division of property and should be separate 
from the alimony award. See Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) 
REPLY TO POINT VII 
At the conclusion of the trial on this matter the Trial Court divided the 
property between the parties. It did so by having the parties alternately choose first 
from the real property and then from the personal property while the Court Clerk 
kept track of the value of each property being awarded. The Trial Court made a 
concerted effort that the result was equal though it awarded the stock to Mr. Godfrey 
and assigned it a value of $0. Aside from the actual value of the stock, both parties 
received an equal value of property. Considering the stock, Ms. Godfrey received 
considerably less property than Mr. Godfrey and she has substantially less income 
with which to pay attorney fees. 
Even if she ultimately receives $1,250 per month in alimony, she would still 
need to cut her budget by approximately $1,000.00 per month just to meet her 
expenses. Ms. Godfrey does not have the ability to pay her attorney fees and has a 
need for such fees being paid by Mr. Godfrey. He has the ability to pay such fees. 
(See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 14 (CA filed May 26, 1994) 
and Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah App. 1989)) 
Ms. Godfrey is also entitled to attorney's fees and costs based on the result 
obtained on the prior appeal and on remand. Utah code Section 30-3-3 grants the 
courts of this State the discretion to award attorney's fees in domestic cases. On 
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appeal, this Court 
. . . usually makes[s] such an award if the requesting party has 
prevailed on at least some of the issues he or she has raised on appeal, 
although under the language of Section 30-3-3, we are not absolutely 
prohibited from making an award to a party who has not prevailed on 
appeal. (See e.g. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 717) 
(Houmont v. Houmont, 739 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App. 1990) and Rappleye v. Rappleye, 
855 P.2d 260, 266-7 (Utah App. 1993)) In the present case, Ms. Godfrey is entitled 
to again prevail on appeal and as such is entitled to her attorney's fees and costs. 
REPLY TO POINT VIII 
In its prior decision, this Court did not remand for any finding concerning the 
debts Mr. Godfrey claimed were owed to his father's estate. The decision completely 
vacated the Trial Court's findings concerning the existence of liens in favor of the 
estate on the real property awarded to Ms. Godfrey. The Trial Court erred in not 
conforming to this Court's prior decision when issuing its Supplemental Decree. This 
Court remanded under the principles of res judicata and directed the Trial Court to 
vacate the finding of real property debt owing to the estate. The Trial Court should 
be directed to enter an order that no liens are owed to the estate on the real property 
awarded Ms. Godfrey. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supplemental Decree should be reversed and remanded on the issue of the 
real property debt. This Court should reverse the alimony award and based on the 
evidence, grant permanent alimony to Ms. Godfrey in the sum of $1,250.00 per 
month. This Court should also reverse the Trial Court's valuation of the stock at only 
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$20,000.00 and it's decision to not award Ms. Godfrey any of its value. This Court 
should place a value on the stock from the fair market values indicated by Mr. Cox, 
award Ms. Godfrey with one-half of that value, and remand solely for consideration 
of the payment method for the award. 
Respectfully submitted this <^ day of October, 1994. 
Je f fWt iorne 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^Q day of October, 1994, I mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Bruce W. Stratford 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Suite 1218 First Security Bank Building 
2404 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
^ ^ . 
25 
